



## Response to Andrew Light's "rereading Bookchin and Marcuse as environmentalist materialists"

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## *DISCUSSION*

### **Response to Andrew Light's "Rereading Bookchin and Marcuse As Environmentalist Materialists"\***

*By Murray Bookchin*

In his attempt to render my ideas "compatible" with those of Marcuse, Andrew Light places an ideological template on my work that pushes my principal ideas to the margins and places secondary ones at the center. No less does he alter the relationship between my work and Marcuse's, exaggerating minimal differences and failing to notice significant ones. So excessive are his rearrangements that most of my response must be devoted to correcting only the most salient of the errors he makes.

1. Light's contrast between my seemingly "materialist" approach and his own "ontological bent" is awkward at best. I have never accepted existentialist uses of the word *ontology* to refer to psychological, subjectivistic, and largely personalistic concerns. The antonym of *materialism*, in my view, is still *idealism*, and both have to be "sublated" by a dialectical naturalist approach. Casting both Marcuse and myself as "materialists," Light (p. 76n) erroneously pits our supposedly "more exclusively social and political concerns" against the "spiritual/philosophical concerns" of theorists like deep ecologists.

But Light implies that I — much more than Marcuse — am indifferent to the subjective, ideological concerns that deep ecology (that is, Light's "ontological" ecology) addresses. That I have criticized tendencies nourished by Lynn White, Jr.'s strictly ideological

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\*See *Capitalism Nature Socialism*, 4 (1), March, 1993.

interpretation of the ecological crisis is no secret. But never has my social orientation minimized the need for a new ecological outlook and ethics. Quite to the contrary: The utopistic visions I have advanced are predicated on the need for an ethics of complementarity, which I articulate in my discussions of an "ecological society" and sensibility. My *The Ecology of Freedom (EF)* is devoted overwhelmingly to cultural, ideological, and subjective concerns. I fail to recognize myself in Light's account of me as a pure "materialist."

2. Lest the reader take Light's word for it (p. 72n) that only in 1980 did I "find [my] voice" and "flesh out [my] mature conception of political ecology beginning with *Toward an Ecological Society*" (*TES*), he or she should be advised that *TES* itself consists of essays that range from 1969 to 1980. Today, when many historians are reconstructing the emergence of ecological thinking and the New Left, it is disconcerting to have to call Light's attention to the fact that my work was certainly quite "fleshed out" by 1965.

3. Contrary to Light, I did not begin my discussions with "an ecological analysis of the historical relationships between humans and nature" (p. 71), and only later "shift the discussion of conflict from the field of human society against non-human nature to divisions within human society itself" (p. 86). I began in the early 1960s with an analysis of the historical relationships between human and human, and I make a *social* analysis of the historical relationship between humans and the natural world. My preoccupation with the effects of unlimited growth, largely rooted in Marx's theory of capitalist accumulation, is hardly the "basis" for my "anarchist position," as Light contends (p. 73). My "anarchist position" rests first and foremost on my critique of hierarchy and my advocacy of its dissolution--a fundamental fact about my work that nowhere appears in Light's discussion.

4. Light's assumption that I reject the "high technology of capitalism and statism" (p. 89) could be made only by a critic who has not read — let alone reread — my 1965 essay "Towards a Liberatory Technology," a pioneering work (if retrospectively a faulty one in some places) that underpins all my thinking on post-scarcity. Devoted overwhelmingly to the subject of technology — indeed, to new "alternative" technologies that were largely neglected when it was written — it is surprising that Light nowhere refers to it. Even my "touted," as Light describes it, *Our Synthetic Environment (OSE)* — a pioneering statement on technological disruptions of the environment

that advanced solar energy, wind power, and organic agriculture as alternative technologies (pp. 242-43) in 1962 (when these technologies were either neglected or in disrepute) — nonetheless contained the observation that "Technology can remove much of the drudgery that burdens human life and leave men [and women] free to use their bodies and minds for highly satisfying activities" (p. 201). Indeed, I have been sharply reproved for holding such "protechnological" views by anarcho-primitivists, some of whom would like to return to a preagricultural world and many of whom regard themselves as deep ecologists. Marcuse, for his part, cited "Towards a Liberatory Technology" in *Counterrevolution and Revolt (CRR)*, in connection with my avowed attempt to use existing technologies to "drive ecology to the point where it is no longer containable within the capitalist framework" (p. 61).

5. It should not be considered surprising that Marcuse and I both worked with these ideas. A theoretical concern with the many liberatory potentialities of postwar technology was very much in the air in the early 1960s. The many discussions surrounding the publication of the famous *The Triple Revolution* in 1963 heightened this concern. I fail to see why Light finds it necessary (p. 80) to point out that my *Post-Scarcity Anarchism (PSA)*, 1971) was published "several years" after Marcuse's *One-Dimensional Man (ODM)*, 1964). The authors of *The Triple Revolution*, and Marcuse himself for that matter, ignored the problematic of how the enormous postwar achievements in technology could be deployed *ecologically* as well as politically, economically, and institutionally in what I have called an "ecological society." My 1965 essays "Ecology and Revolutionary Thought" and "Towards a Liberatory Technology" attempted to do just this, calling for decentralization and the use of miniaturized technics, as well as alternative energy sources, ecological technologies, organic agriculture, and radical solutions to the newly emerging environmental problems.

6. Curiously, Light's account of my concept of post-scarcity (pp. 79-80) only vaguely hints at the crucial role I assign to technology, even leaving the reader in some doubt as to what I mean by this concept at all. Instead, Light gives centrality to the distinction between "true" and "false" needs. It should be noted that although this distinction suffuses Marcuse's writings up to his last works, it is hardly a unique contribution on his part to social thought — the problematic reaches well back into Marx's *Grunderisse* (e.g., p. 231). But the centrality Light attributes to "true" and "false needs" in my own work

strikes me as off base, since, unlike Marcuse's, my work usually gives centrality to "choice" rather than "needs." I have always emphasized that everything that privileged people today enjoy must be made *available* to everyone so that they can rationally choose in a materially abundant society what they really want and need to *enjoy* life, indeed to "break the grip of the 'fetishization of needs,' to dispel it" and "to recover the *freedom of choice*" (EF, p. 69).

7. Doubtless, Marcuse's *ODM* was also oriented generally toward something like a notion of "post-scarcity," as Light indicates. But this book, appearing just as the New Left and counterculture were emerging, was highly pessimistic about the likelihood that people could really ever divest themselves of their "preconditioning." While Marcuse acknowledged that only the people themselves have a right "to decide which needs should be developed and satisfied" (*ODM*, p. 6), he detailed at length the "social controls" of "one-dimensional society," to the point that "mass production and mass distribution claim the *entire* individual" (*ODM*, p. 10). Thus the obstacles people faced in developing the autonomy necessary to choose seemed insurmountable. Indeed, even when Marcuse adduced the need for a new subjectivity, he reneged on this prospect by writing in a dystopian vein that "the dialectical concept pronounces its own hopelessness," because "with the technological conquest of nature grows the conquest of man by man" (*ODM*, p. 253). The "Great Refusal" he offered in the work stemmed from a critical theory that "possesses no concepts which could bridge the gap between the present and its future; ...it remains negative" (*ODM*, p. 257), leaving his readers with only an individualistic or personal form of revolt.

My own work stood in sharp contrast to this claim, emphasizing as it did the growing flexibility and freedom that postwar technologies made possible, and calling for a broad movement for an ecological society rather than individual revolt alone. Far from minimizing the possibilities for liberation in a seemingly inexorable "technological conquest of nature," I placed the domination of human by human in logical and historical priority to both ecological dislocations and the idea of dominating nature, opening rather than foreclosing the possibilities for building a post-scarcity society.

8. Although Light uses the phrase "the domination of nature" as a concept in both Marcuse's and my work, I have never regarded it as a meaningful expression, even in my mid-1960s writings on ecology.

The "idea" or "notion" of "dominating nature," I have repeatedly pointed out, is a projection of the domination of human by human onto the nonhuman world. Highly personified, anthropomorphic notions like "domination," "liberation," and "exploitation" are meaningful only in *social* and *psychological* terms, as are anthropomorphic ideas of "nature" as a "co-victim" with humans. Such language may be compelling *metaphorically*, but today it is being taken literally by ecomystics (especially in "ontological ecology") and should be eschewed. (I myself once called for a "new animism" in a future society, an expression that I now reject.)

9. Light is clearly in error when he attributes to me (p. 73n) the belief that there is an "innate biological foundation for mutual support among animals," such as the one in which Kropotkin rooted his notion of mutual aid. Indeed, I am very alienated by instinct theory *as such* (whether it be the Russian anarchist's "social instinct" or Marcuse's, for that matter), an important difference between myself and both men that Light seems not to have observed. Nor do I believe that empathetic behavior is "automatically normative" (Light, p. 88) — or indeed that any social and ecological phenomenon is automatic. To query me on whether there is a "one-to-one" relationship "between social evolution and natural evolution," as Light does (p. 88n), is gratuitous to say the least. As he should know from his rereading of my work, I hold that the natural world is a dialectically cumulative evolution of life ("first nature"), society ("second nature"), and projectively, "free nature," or a "nature" that can *potentially* be rendered self-conscious by a rational, ecological, and free society. The "thesis of a necessary social evolution" with "a necessary direction" that Light (p. 87) attributes to me is quite simply wrong. Indeed, I take great pains to *mediate* the "connection between human and social evolution," especially in my account in *EF* of the transformations from the biological facts of kinship into the social facts of citizenship, of age groups into gerontocracies, of gender differences into patriarchies, indeed of early egalitarian societies into hierarchical ones. I repeatedly emphasize that "self-directiveness" or "self-organization" in evolution is a "tendency," not a teleological "final cause" or the like.

10. If Light finds it "odd" that my "seeming familiarity" with evolutionary theory reflects no knowledge of the work of Stephen Jay Gould and Ernst Mayr (p. 87n), may I remind him that my *The Philosophy of Social Ecology (PSE)* devotes a full page (p. 40) to a criticism of Gould's evolutionary nominalism and, by inference,

Mayr's. I myself find it rather "odd" that Light could have completely missed this discussion in his rereading of that book.

11. If my style is "confrontational," as Light calls it (and he rarely allows that I criticize Marcuse; indeed, I always seem to "attack" the man); if I have argued, cajoled, and denounced in my writing, it is because I was long engaged with harsh opponents in an era when clashes of ideas had concrete and earthy meaning in movements that I and other people regarded as potentially revolutionary. At various points over the course of those decades, when major issues were very much at stake, I was obliged to forcefully advocate practical directions that others, with equally "confrontational" styles, tried to countervail.

12. Do I equate "all forms of Marxism with the societies of 'actually existing socialism,'" as Light claims (p. 92n), and reduce "all of neo-Marxism to forms which smell of old Soviet style authoritarianism" (p. 92)? If one of my real concerns in "Beyond Neo-Marxism" that a Marxist like Marcuse depicted Eastern Europe as "the socialist orbit" (see *TES*, p. 119) means that I type all neo-Marxists as "adherents of old Soviet style authoritarianism" (which my use of the prefix *neo* hardly implies), let the shoe be placed on the appropriate foot. Suffice it to say that Marx's views, in my eyes, basically meant "historical materialism" and its most significant ramifications, not a "Soviet style" ideology inspired by gulags.

13. As for why I neglect Merleau-Ponty's work on the dialectic, may I suggest to Light that it is not necessary to "exhaust all of the possible adventures of the dialectic" (p. 93) — such as those of Kojève, Mure, Adorno, Sartre, and Taylor, etc., as well as Merleau-Ponty — before engaging Hegel and Marx, when those other "adventures" hardly approach the historical or philosophical importance of Hegel and Marx in insight, impact, and comprehensiveness.

14. Today the libertarian potentialities of the movements in which I participated are largely "suppressed," to use a Frankfurt School term, although I tried to foster them as best I could. In the 1980s and 1990s ecology movement, deep ecology, or Light's "ontological ecology," is the most obscurantist and potentially reactionary tendency around, for reasons that I have often stated over the past few years. Yet Arne Naess, one of the most egregiously self-contradictory of deep ecology theorists, earns respectful acknowledgment from Light. Naess's book *Ecology, Community, and Lifestyle*, Light tells us,

"makes a strong contribution to the materialist dimension of political ecology" (p. 78), presumably because of its chapters devoted to politics and economics, which are strikingly reformist and muddled — despite the efforts of David Rothenberg to make them reasonably consistent.

15. Although Light delivers three pages of encomia to deep ecology, he nowhere apprises his readers of the *concrete*, extremely eventful issues that led to my 1987 attack on deep ecology. These include Edward Abbey's description of American culture as "northern European" and his explicitly racist opposition to Mexican immigration; David Foreman's statement (since retracted) that starving Ethiopian children should be denied aid and that Mexicans should not be permitted to cross "our" borders; the disquieting fact that this statement was made in an interview conducted by Bill Devall, one of deep ecology's American notables, and that Devall wrote an introduction adulating Foreman when the interview was published in *Simply Living*; and "Miss Ann Thropy's" blessing of the AIDS epidemic in the pages of *Earth First!* — not to speak of other, similarly despicable statements that outstanding deep ecology theorists criticized, albeit often mildly, only *after* I "attacked" them and brought them to wider public attention.

16. Light himself does not seem to have made up his own mind about the political aims of his article. He suggests quite earnestly, at one point, that social and deep ecologists should get together, and he proposes that Marcuse's work "may even help to improve the capability of social ecologists to reconcile their views with" those of deep ecologists (p. 94). But only a few pages later, he proceeds to claim that "Marcuse and other critical social theorists" could "become allies in Bookchin's struggle with deep ecologists rather than representing another front" (p. 97). I am at a loss to understand what Light's advice to me is: Am I to reconcile myself with deep ecology, or am I to continue to fight it? Much as I would welcome the collaboration of Marcusans — or more precisely, with libertarian socialists, generally — I'm not certain what Light means when he urges a "recognition that the non-human natural world participates in some ontic authenticity by itself" (p. 97). Is he advocating a morality based on a notion of "intrinsic worth," which could easily lead to a quasi-mystical "biocentric" sensibility like that of deep ecology?

At this point I must cease this line-by-line correction of Light's misinterpretations, an endeavor that, if adequately undertaken, would really require twice the length of Light's own article to complete. The



fact is that nowhere does Light examine the internal development of my writings or accurately contextualize them in their time and place, much less deal in a nuanced manner with my explorations of hierarchy, humanity's place in nature, the ethical aspects of technology; or with my reasons for diverging from Marxism; or even with libertarian municipalism, my concrete political outlook. Doubtless it would be difficult for him to do all this owing to limits of space, but his article does not even begin to take up my ongoing attempt to countervail the mysticism currently enveloping so much of the ecology and feminist movements.

What Herbert Marcuse and I do have in common is that we were both initially rooted in revolutionary Marxism and in neo-Hegelianism, a commonality that, under capitalism at least, linked us in a shared perception that the material conditions for freedom involve a sufficient abundance of the means of life to free people for creative activity and a truly democratic way of life. We agreed that the era of proletarian hegemony had come to an end — a *very* widespread perception on the left, I may add, in the aftermath of the Second World War, and one that I personally developed in my experiences on a factory floor, not by reading Frankfurt School theorists. We converged, quite independently of each other, on the idea that new social issues were supplanting those on which radicals of the 1930s had been focused.

For me, the possible result could be a reconstruction of "the People," impelled by ecological crises and technological innovations, along revolutionary lines. As an anarchist, my attention also increasingly focused on transclass strata, such as oppressed ethnic groups, women, young people, and the then-emerging counterculture — all of which, I believed, reflected the importance of *hierarchy* in analyzing social phenomena. Marcuse, by contrast, responded to the same situation in essentially Marxian terms by retaining a vague class concept linked by tradition to Marx's proletariat but, in *Essay on Liberation (EL)* extended — awkwardly, in my view — to embrace insurgent peasants in the Third World as an "external proletariat" (*EL*, pp. 80-82).

Although I came to know Marcuse fairly well after about 1965 and saw him fairly often thereafter until the 1971 Buffalo *Telos* Conference, my contacts with him were more political than theoretical.

I was eager to discuss with him the political implications of the libertarian dimension in his ideas. I found that his attempts to define the current social upheavals in rather traditional Marxian class terms and perspectives were sharply at odds with his repeated claim that new forces and radical strata had emerged. In short, I thought such an analysis was inadequate and inconsistent.

I tried to explore with him, for example, how he could approvingly invoke the image of "black flags" in *EL*, and on the same page (p. viii) claim that "In Vietnam, in Cuba, in China, a revolution is being defended and driven forward which struggles to eschew the bureaucratic administration of socialism." I tried to shake the surprisingly orthodox "class analysis" he advanced at his 1966 lecture at the NYU Law School, in which he argued, as I recall it, that the Vietnamese peasantry were the globalized "proletariat" who were fighting "bourgeois America" — a position that the Weatherpeople later absorbed in one way or another in their own "war" against "Amerika."

This was not the only inconsistency in Marcuse that troubled me. His tendency to extravagantly laud the counterculture's mindless antics in the later 1960s seemed at odds with his actually sound earlier view (as we now know) that "the gimmicks of dress and undress" and "the wilder paraphernalia of the hot or cool life" are "a vehicle of stabilization and even conformity," as he put it in his preface to the 1961 paperback edition of *Eros and Civilization* (Vintage Press ed., p. ix).

Another major contradiction that troubled me involved Marcuse's acceptance of representative democracy, even as he also professed to support direct democracy. His argument in *EL* that "direct action and uncivil disobedience become for the rebels [of 1968] integral parts of the transformation of the indirect democracy of corporate capitalism into a direct democracy in which elections and representation no longer serve as institutions of domination" (*EL*, p. 69) were quite contradictory. That Marcuse in one sentence mutated his approval of "direct democracy" into a qualified acceptance of "representation" is reinforced by his footnote on direct democracy on the same page, which observes that "in modern mass society, democracy, no matter in what form, is not conceivable without a system of representation." I had further difficulty with *CRR* where Marcuse saw "councils" ("soviets" or "Raße") as expressions of or

transitions to "local popular assemblies" (pp. 44-45), much as though the history of these council institutions had not shown that they invariably took on a hierarchical form. Although he seemed to support "self-determination" in this passage, some of his observations on self-determination in *ODM* contained a disturbing disjunction of means and ends: "self-determination in the production and distribution of vital goods would be wasteful," he wrote. In production and distribution, "centralized control is rational if it establishes the preconditions for meaningful self-determination" (*ODM*, p. 251). Despite his use of the image of "black flags," Marcuse was by no means a consistent libertarian when he offered this rationale for "centralized control."

No less disquieting to me was Marcuse's 1972 claim in *CRR* that European "Communist parties and unions are still the only *mass* organizations on the Left of Social Democracy" and hence "are still a *potentially* revolutionary force" (p. 41) — a claim that had been literally challenged decades earlier by the entire anti-Stalinist revolutionary left. Marcuse's later praise of "Eurocommunism," his suggestion that radicals undertake the "long march through the institutions" (*CRR*, p. 55) — from which, unfortunately, so few have since emerged — and finally his withdrawal in his last years into advocating the kind of individualistic revolt he had called for in *ODM* a decade earlier: all of this is hardly a trajectory that a serious revolutionary would be disposed to accept.

Instead of providing theoretical leadership to the New Left, let alone political leadership, Marcuse in my view tended regrettably to react to the New Left and to the mass media, despite occasional admonitions, some of which I found contradictory. When I reproved Marcuse for his inconsistencies, the most I received from him in reply was a friendly hand-grasp of my shoulder.

Although Marcuse and I differed on these and other basic political points during our shared political lifetimes, I tried very much not to regard him as an ideological adversary until the 1970s, and the favorable comments I did make about him, Light now either downplays or minimizes, apparently in the belief that the various criticisms I made of Marcuse amount to outright animosity. He adduces only the least favorable compliment I gave Marcuse in "Beyond Neo-Marxism" — my praise of him "as an *individual* thinker" — and dismisses even that as a "small disclaimer" that was "slightly tongue-in-cheek" on my part (p. 92n). Apparently he has an unusual knowledge of my motives.

Had his eyes traveled only four lines past this, he would have found that I praised

Marcuse's own courage in venturing into social issues that neo-Marxists usually avoid—direct democracy, decentralization, representation, spontaneity and liberatory structures — [by doing which] he clearly reveals the extent to which these issues are intrinsically alien to Marxism as such, indeed to socialism (*TES*, pp. 222-23).

Nor does Light seem to have noticed that in my 1969 "Listen, Marxist!" I made a spirited defense of Marcuse against Maoist charges that he was a "cop" because of his 1940s connections with the OSS, forerunner of the CIA (*PSA*, p. 207n), for which Marcuse personally thanked me in Buffalo.

I would have not wanted to deal as critically as I have here with a man I personally liked, but Marcuse's own inconsistencies oblige me to do so. Even less do I want to deal at length with recent attempts to recreate Marcuse as an ecologist. When I visited him in La Jolla around 1970, he dismissed environmental problems as technologically resolvable by the bourgeoisie. Indeed, I found him to be singularly unresponsive to any discussion of ecology generally. His chapter "Nature and Revolution" in *CRR* is a very mixed bag, combining brilliant insights with mythopoeic Freudian categories and the "young" Marx's putative "naturalism"; or combining a reading of Plato's "recollection" and "innate ideas" with a Kantian synthesis of "man and nature," in which "Beauty appears as the 'symbol of morality.'" Marcuse's assertion that "The faculty of being 'receptive,' 'passive' is a precondition for freedom" (*CRR*, p. 74) seems curious in juxtaposition to his earlier, unrenounced claim that "there are two kinds of mastery: a repressive and a liberatory one" (*ODM*, p. 236).

The utopian tendencies that I tried to address and foster in the 1960s and 1970s movements have virtually disappeared from a left that today largely identifies socialism with social democracy — in fact if not in name. Nor does the revival of Marcuse's highly mythopoeic drama between two "drives, or instincts," Thanatos and Eros, help in this regard. His 1979 lecture "Ecology and the Critique of Modern Society" (published in *CNS*, 3 (3), September, 1992), which "relies largely upon basic psychoanalytic concepts developed by Freud," claims that "balance between these two drives also is found within individuals" (p. 31), contributing, like *ODM*, to the overly self-centered

emphasis endemic to ecomysticism that I have been trying to countervail today. Marcuse's reliance on instinct theory, however expansive or liberatory it may seem, is disconcertingly mythopoeic and personalistic. Indeed, instinct theory's dubious fruits now seem to belong to the modern therapy generation — certainly not a development Marcuse would have welcomed.

I certainly make no claim that what I have written over the past thirty years is graven in stone. The transclass struggles on which I counted in the 1960s and 1970s are today either distorted or coopted, or hopefully are simmering as "suppressed potentialities" that a later period may yet actualize. Whether my writings from those years are right or wrong, they are at least marked by a degree of consistency and elaboration that I fail to find in Marcuse's trajectory. Without eschewing in any way the need for a new spirituality, character structure, individuality, or sensibility, I have always grounded my ideas of ecology and anarchism in *social* relationships and a straightforward *naturalism*.

Marcuse's fluctuating notions of "class" and culture; his notions of Communist-inspired "revolutions" that "eschew" a bureaucratic socialism and his quasi-anarchic notions of "direct democracy;" his highly anthropomorphic, often romantic view of "Nature" and his call to "master" this "Nature" socially and technologically in order to "liberate her;" his advocacy of a highly personalistic revolt and a "mass" social revolt (*EL*, p. viii and *CRR*, p. 75) — all these have always struck me as being at odds with each other, not a dialectical "unity of opposites." I do not know if his overly subjectivist views would make us allies in a conflict with deep ecology, or if they would have made us opponents, any more than Light seems to know. What is at issue for me today is that in the name of "spirituality," the ecology and feminist movements and fairly privileged strata in the English-speaking world may well become enveloped by a mysticism that fosters "nature"-worship, a paganistic, primitivistic antirationalism, and indeed a markedly passive-receptive outlook. Light has not dealt with the dangers these problems present at all, or with my assessment of the social quietism, indeed the considerable misanthropy that exists today. Whether Marcuse's proclivity for Freudian mythopoetics and individualistic revolt will help us is a problem that the reader will have to decide.

To conclude: It is regrettable that Light, with many misinterpretations, has focused on the marginalia of my work rather than its central theses, and that he exhibits little critical concern for Marcuse's intellectual waywardness and contradictory ideas. Unfortunately, *CNS* readers are unlikely to benefit greatly either from Light's misreadings of social ecology or from my necessarily choppy attempt to correct them.

## *REPLY*

### Which Side Are You On?: A Rejoinder to Murray Bookchin\*

*By Andrew Light*

Contrary to Bookchin's assumption, my essay is not an attempt to assess or reconstruct all of his or Marcuse's work, nor to compare him and Marcuse on the virtues of representative or direct democracy, nor to fully explore his account of natural and social evolution, nor to completely evaluate and reassess his critique of deep ecology, nor to fully investigate all possible problems, discrepancies and shortfalls of deep ecology. My aim was to show that Bookchin and Marcuse can both be read interestingly as taking a generally similar position on certain metatheoretical questions in their investigations of the relationship between technology and the environment. I have taken great pains to lay out the similarities in part of their work on *this* issue and this issue alone, acknowledging along the way some important differences between them, and argued for a new way of thinking about the varieties of political ecology. Bookchin has not answered the core of that argument. He has instead attacked minor criticisms of his work and has not provided us with an alternative framework for thinking through the differences between various positions in radical ecology as I have tried to do. Nor has Bookchin, given the chance, cleaned up the conceptual difficulties I have identified in his theory of the politics of technology.

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